This paper explores how different modalities, spatialities and scales of power operate in a geopolitical context. By tracing the dynamic and shifting economic geographies of state and firm power in the events leading up to the collapse of a major Australian firm, Ansett Airlines, it reveals the difference that place and position make to the creation and use of power. The paper stresses agents' relational positioning, their 'places' in multiple networks of association and the ways in which their past actions and visions of the future condition their strategic options. The paper contextualises the workings of power and explores how power relationships are re-configured in specific contested events. It concludes that power cannot be separated from the spatial and temporal dimensions of actual contexts, from actor's positions in contexts, or from their strategic objectives.
Introduction
In this paper, the struggles that have reshaped the Australasian aviation sector provide the raw material for a critique of John Allen's (2003) spatialised definition of power as a 'relational effect of social interaction'. Based on this critique, the paper constructs an alternative spatialised understanding of the workings of power that link power with positions and strategies. Because its competitive dimensions are focused on territories and access to territories, the aviation sector provides an illuminating case for exploring the spatiality of power. In contrast to the way leading firms exert repressive 'power over' their suppliers in the manufacturing industry (Rutherford and Holmes, 2008) , power relations in the aviation industry are played out in multiply scaled arenas of intersecting firm, state and inter-state 1 networks. They incorporate complex interdependencies. The paper focuses on the reworking of power relations among Singaporean, Australian and New Zealand aviation firms and their host states in the 1990s, following the deregulation of Australia's domestic air services. It highlights the deteriorating position and eventual demise of an Australian airline, Ansett Airlines.
How power is defined very much determines its location and spatial expression. This paper contributes to the theorisation of power's spatiality in four ways. First, it associates power's spatiality with agents' relational positioning or 'place' in a constructed world of relationships and an evolving history of interactions. Second, it proposes that the impact of power is intrinsically related to its timing and infers that power's spatiality cannot be divorced from its temporality. Third, it contends that agents' dispositions and strategic options, and therefore the types of power available to them, are the product of their past interactions as expressed in their contemporary spatio-temporal positioning. This positioning is dynamic, constructed and requires ongoing maintenance. Fourth, it highlights how specific events precipitate reconfigurations of power networks and the positions actors have in them.
This approach, it is argued, circumvents any need to explain power as somehow traversing across space.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section critically reviews recent theories of power and sets out this paper's approach. Its arguments are developed via a sustained engagement with John Allen's (2003) view of power as an immanent 'effect of social interaction'. These ideas are then demonstrated by tracing the shifting networks of relations between states and firms in Australasian aviation as they restructured after air services were deregulated, privatised and marketised. The penultimate section explores the implications of this case study for theories of power. The conclusion insists that a spatially attuned understanding of power must incorporate the positions of 2 agents in relation to others and recognise how the histories and trajectories of their interactions condition the strategies available, their timing and their subsequent outcomes.
Spatialising Power
The complexities embedded in the notion of power have produced a massive literature spanning numerous disciplines. Their approaches to the location and spatial workings of power vary depending on whether power is defined as a capacity held by entities in proportion to their resources, is viewed as a mobilisation of resources or is conceived as being woven in and through structures (see Lukes, 1986) . John Allen's (2003) Lost Geographies of Power is informed by a selection of these texts. This section begins with a brief introduction to the literature on power, outlines Allen's approach and then offers a critique of it.
Three Understandings of Power
It is useful to begin with what are known as the 'three faces' of power (Lukes, 1974) . The first 'face' is found in Dahl's (1957) behaviourist view, where power involves one agent impelling another to do something that he or she would not otherwise have chosen to do. This commonplace view is epitomised by the metaphor of power being 'wielded' like a weapon. It assumes that agents 'have' power and that they prevail 'over' other (less powerful) agents.
Power is therefore something that agents own and deploy; a quantifiable, embodied and dispositional quality. This power definition underpins critical realism's view of power as a latent capacity that can be held in reserve (Bhaskar, 1975) and infuses realist theories of international relations in which 'strong' and powerful states uncomplicatedly lord over 'weak' less powerful states (see Guzzini, 1993) . Allen (2003) contends that this approach imbues power with a mechanical or 'thing-like' quality and, consequently, with fixed spatial 3 characteristics. He suggests that in this form, power's spatiality 'radiates out' from its core, travels intact across space and operates with predictable effects. Bachrach and Baratz's (1962) second face of power adds the possibility that power is found in non-action; in the capacity to manoeuvre or manipulate a situation to achieve a desired outcome. Exercising this form of power does not necessarily require that agents do anything out of the ordinary, although it does demand the ability to maintain the status quo.
The third face of power incorporates the first two but adds the capacity to modify beliefs. In this form, power insinuates itself into social practices, shapes the organisation of space and permeates the construction of subjectivities. Power becomes an immanent force inseparable from its effects (Foucault, 1970) ; a force that is at once 'everywhere' and 'nowhere'. Such power can stifle political dissent if agents embody accepted norms of conduct to such a degree that they become incapable of resistance. Whilst sympathetic to this view, Allen (2003) is keen to reinvigorate it by reasserting the capacity to rebel.
Lost Geographies of Power
A second group of authors understand power as a structuring social context or field of forces. Parsons (1957) , for example, rejects definitions that locate power 'in' entities. Parsons views power as a 'systems resource', analogous to money, that constitutes the legitimate institutionalisation of authority. In a related vein, Hannah Arendt (1958) defines power as a collective force that corresponds to the ability to act in concert. In her hands, power is a fluid, expandable and emergent force generated by collective action. Allen (2003) is attracted to the way this approach views power as a product of spatio-temporal arrangements and as involving control over both resources and rules of interaction. But he is critical of its undertheorisation of power's spatiality.
The main concern of Allen's own theory of power is with how power traverses space; that is, with understanding how it 'plays across the gap between here and there' (Allen, 2004, p. 25) . Allen develops an approach in which power is neither centred nor decentred, but is instead a 'relational effect of social interaction' that is produced in and through inherently spatial social interactions (Allen, 2003, p. 40) . Thus defined, power exists only in practice. It confers the ability to mobilise resources. From this perspective, resources are not in themselves 'power' and those in command of resources do not always prevail (Allen, 2003, p. 190) . Moreover, since power is removed from its embeddedness in entities, it has no 'predefined distances' or 'simple proximities'; its spatiality is both complex and relational (Allen, 2004, p. 19) . Power adopts a variety of forms or 'modalities' (for example, seduction, coercion, manipulation or authority) each of which possesses its own 'empirical logic' and spatial expression. Each modality's spatial reach then depends on how its mobilisation produces a succession of 'mediating effects' in space and time (Allen 2003, p. 97) . In actual situations, multiple modalities operate together as complex sets of topographical 'arrangements'. Consequently, outcomes are not pre-given; they depend on both the modes of power in use and the social and physical distance between actors. As different modalities of power combine to stretch, shrink or dissolve space, power becomes constitutive of space and the spatial becomes imbued with power. In essence then, Allen's spatialisation shifts the concept of power from a dispositional attribute 'held' by entities to a quality immanent in its multi-faceted forms of expression. This decontextualises and democratises power, restricting it to an 'effective' moment of interaction that is independent of the resources and the capacities of actors.
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Three aspects of Allen's spatialisation of power require further explication. First, Allen's definition of power is not exclusive -many phenomena are 'relational effects of social interaction'. If his definition is seen to imply that all social interactions are imbued with and express power relations, then some demarcation of power from other aspects of social interaction is needed. The extent to which power infiltrates social interactions based on 5 economic exchanges or involving mutually beneficial alliances, for example, would vary substantially between instances. Allowing the idea of power to subsume all social interactions would blunt its analytical utility; but the manner in which power relations enter into 'arrangements' with other types of social interactions requires further specification. Second, it is by no means clear how Allen's framework incorporates structural forces or abstractions;
forces that cannot easily be explained as combinations of 'modalities' of interaction. Allen's examples focus mainly at the micro-scale, on relations between paired entities, where structural forces are not immediately visible. Yet both actors and structures contribute to the configurations of power relations, especially in higher-order systems of authority and governance, such as those that exist in international institutions (Yeung, 2005, p. 38 ). Allen's emphasis on social inter-action does not easily accommodate agenda-setting or the bureaucratic and diplomatic strategies of non-intervention. Power expressed in non-action could not be understood as a 'relational effect of social interaction' unless the effects of past interactions are somehow stored within existing arrangements, in which case power might return to its familiar identity as an individual capacity or held resource.
The third issue is power's relationship to cause and effect. Consistent with his critical realist understanding of causality, Sayer (2004, p. 260-64 ) understands Allen's use of the word 'effect' in the phrase 'relational effect of social interaction' to mean result or outcome.
He consequently accuses Allen of conflating power with its effects; of defining power tautologically as a synonym for its outcomes. Perhaps Allen is more correctly read as focusing on the exercise of power; where the word 'effect' is used in the sense of a mobilisation or causal force, analogous to Giddens's (1977, p. 384) 86) does when he views power as a "conceptual translation point" located at the interface between cause and effect, integrated into the spatio-temporal fabric and reproduced "through the active maintenance of certain structural social relations". Recognising the processes of power-as it imbues positioning, strategic intentions, timing, constraints, and outcomes-8 makes it possible to understand power relations without resorting to the idea that power is held in reserve or that it is somehow transmitted between 'here' and 'there'.
Positions and Power in Australasian Aviation
The shifting power relations of Australasian aviation in the 1990s provide an opportunity to explore the spatial workings of power in practice. The discussion in this section considers three states (Singapore, Australia and New Zealand) and four airlines (Singapore Airlines, Qantas, Ansett Airlines and Air New Zealand). Their field of associations included twentyone separate but simultaneous dyad relationships (three state-to-state, six firm-to-firm, four direct state-to-firm, and eight indirect firm-to-state). The firms involved in this field of interactions differed in resources, state patronage, international links and political influence.
Their relationships with states involved decreasing degrees of overt dependence, whilst their relationships with each other exhibited increasing degrees of interdependence. We can think of these dependencies and interdependencies in spatial terms, as social distance or proximity.
Following Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) , firms' dependencies can also be understood as expressing asymmetrical power relationships and as conditioning the types of power-such as coercion, bargaining, cooperation or competition-available to them. Thus, their 'repertoires' of strategies and tactics depend on their 'place' in an underlying structure of associations. Stopford and Strange (1991, p. 19) with other states over air service access, but these discussions can never be independent of international geo-politics.
Airlines are influenced by a potent mix of political and economic concerns. They operate within national jurisdictions but provide international services that are governed by a plethora of international rules and treaties among states. This reality requires them to maintain relationships with states and to take geo-political influences and tensions into account. Transnational regulatory structures constrain firms' activities and force firms to cooperate with states to secure market access. The economics of aviation businesses are conditioned by the high costs of aircraft and fuel. Airline profitability depends on maximising capacity utilisation, streamlining connectivities and efficiently matching service capacity to consumer demand. Consequently, firms have an incentive to cooperate (for example, through code-sharing arrangements) on low density routes, while competing for market share on high density routes. The low marginal cost of carrying additional passengers on any flight produces the sector's propensity for aggressive ticket price discounting.
Airlines favour organising service delivery in a hub-and-spoke arrangement because it reduces costs, consolidates activity and enables aircraft size to be optimally matched to route demand (Button, 2002) . But hubbing is resisted by the cities, states and airlines peripheralised by their relegation to the status of spokes to a dominant hub.
In this environment, airlines behave strategically. They routinely employ formal strategic planning tools to identify optimal strategies, consistent with their longer range plans, and to predict the likely second-and third-order effects of their own and their competitors' strategic moves (Godet, 1991) . Competitive strategies may involve building mutually beneficial alliances with other firms, states or non-state actors. Airlines' strategies are often predatory (Hinthorne, 1996) . Competitive advantage can be secured by seeking to alter policy settings or by circumventing regulatory constraints. The industry's legalistic regulatory framework tends to formalise competition in struggles over access to territories, routes and destinations. respondents to append additional information about the circumstances of the collapse. This generated about fifty responses and included some detailed accounts by former managers. A selection of twenty survey respondents participated in depth interviews which, inter alia, discussed the events leading up to the collapse and workers' responses to them. Additional information was collected in later telephone follow-up surveys. A separate, internet-based survey of former Ansett employees who had found employment with overseas airlines, especially in Asia, also produced insights about the configurations of airlines in the region (see Weller, 2004; 2009, forthcoming (Mann, 1986) .
International air services were coordinated under a negotiated regulatory framework designed to respect national territorial jurisdictions. As early as 1919, the Paris Convention established each state's complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory (Abeyratne, 1993) . The 1940 Chicago Conference later reinforced this framework by codifying the rights and responsibilities of air service providers into a set of rules known as the Freedoms of the Air (Table 1) . This regulatory framework produced an 'ensemble' arrangement controlled by states and designed to repel encroachments on national territories (see Agnew, 1999) . The 13 international web of regulation constrained the activities of airlines (Kasper, 1988) . Figure 1 depicts the aviation industry structure produced by this Westphalian system as comprising three rigidly separated national air services in which states exercised direct authority over their owned airlines. States could influence each other through the persuasive means of diplomacy, but had little direct influence over other states' airlines. Inter-airline competition, when it existed, was intertwined with national interests and played out through negotiations about access (as framed by the agenda-setting parameters of the Freedoms). In 1979, for example, Qantas and British Airways attempted to force Asian carriers off the lucrative Australia-London (Kangaroo) route by convincing the Australian and British governments to limit the 'sixth freedom' rights of Asian carriers (Conybeare, 1987) . 
De-regulation and New Relationships
In the 1980s, governments came to view globalisation and market competition as a precondition to sustainable long-term national competitiveness. Competitive markets were seen to make airline services more efficient and more responsive to market signals, which in turn would reduce the costs of trade, facilitate the expansion of export industries and promote aggregate welfare. The regulatory frameworks and state patronage that had previously underpinned the aviation sector were recast as 'non-tariff barriers' that inhibited the expansion of international trade (Findlay et al., 1997 In Australia, the reform process was slow. After a series of reports highlighting the high costs of air travel (Forsyth and Hocking, 1985) and a major inquiry in 1986 (May et al., 1986) , the Government resolved to deregulate the domestic market, to privatise Qantas and to open Australia's international aviation markets to competition. It nonetheless set conditions on Qantas's sale that would guarantee continuing national control: no more than 49% of the carrier would be sold to institutional buyers, no more than 35% to overseas buyers and no more than 25% to any single buyer.
Airlines prepared for impending deregulation by shifting their competitive strategies.
Australia's only private national airline, Ansett Airlines, shored up its competitive position by purchasing numerous small regional airlines and incorporating them into its network. In 1986 it also extended into New Zealand by purchasing a regional service and re-launching it as Ansett NZ. The Ansett Group also began divesting non-core businesses and accelerated internal efficiency-oriented restructuring. In 1989, Australia's impending regulatory changes (or, more exactly, airlines' cost-containment strategies in anticipation of the changes) triggered Australia's national pilot's strike. Its eventual defeat enabled Australian airlines to restructure their employment practices in preparation for a more competitive environment.
As planned, Australia's 'Two Airline' domestic regulatory structure was dismantled in 1990. Regulations establishing a competitive framework were then phased in to induce the two domestic carriers, Ansett and TAA, to operate competitively. Additional reforms announced in February 1992 allowed Qantas to fly on domestic routes (creating the possibility of it becoming a third domestic airline), enabled domestic airlines to fly on international routes and commenced negotiations toward an 'Open Skies' agreement with New Zealand that would establish a single trans-Tasman aviation market. These liberalisations aimed to construct a competitive Australasian market.
In theory, TAA and Ansett Airlines would become true competitors after deregulation. In practice, however, they joined forces in a price war that crushed the market's new entrants Compass Airlines I and II (Wilson, 2002) . Meanwhile, Qantas maintained its focus on international services. As a consequence, a de-facto two airline arrangement continued to operate, but with the two main players (TAA and Ansett) specialising their services and destinations in an effort to establish quasi-monopolistic control over niche market segments. Ansett Airlines, with its regional interests in Australia and New Zealand, was well placed to prosper in an opening Australasian market (Kissling, 1998) .
In September 1992, the Australian government moved to break the continuing domestic duopoly by selling the state-owned domestic carrier TAA (now renamed Australian Airlines) to the state-owned international carrier Qantas. The AUD$400 million sale provided Qantas with a domestic customer base to 'feed' its international services. Because the merger would enable Qantas to compete in a deregulated international market, it also made Qantas more attractive to prospective investors. Soon after, Qantas was partially privatised. After considering numerous offers, the Government elected to sell a 25% interest to British Airways (BA). This link would strengthen Qantas's global position by giving it access to BA's superior resources and technologies. 4 However, commentators saw the move as subordinating Qantas to BA, as repositioning it as the 'Asia Pacific piece' in British Airways' 'global jigsaw' (AFR 1993, p. 35) and as a bit-part player in British Airways' 'grand strategy' of global service reach (Richardson, 1992) .
The state-orchestrated re-positioning of Qantas altered power relations among the region's other air service firms. If air traffic between Australia and Europe used Hong Kong rather than Singapore for refuelling, as was likely in a Qantas-BA alliance, they would directly threaten SIA's regional position (AFR 1993, p. 35) . Such a reconfiguration would have also directly challenged Singapore's development strategy, which sought to position the island as a key node in globalising flows (Castells, 1988) and which was predicated on Singapore's positioning as the region's primary air service hub (Bowen, 2000; Ragamuran, 1986) . Already, Singapore Airlines' growth during the 1980s had been based around 'sixth freedom' travel to and from Australia (Hanlon, 1999 ). In October 1996, the region's geometries of power (Massey, 1993) shifted dramatically when Air New Zealand purchased a 50% share in Ansett Airlines. The purchase gave Air NZ access to the Australian domestic market and to Ansett's extensive regional feeder network without having to rely on the planned single aviation market (Kissling, 1998) .
The purchase tilted the region's inter-firm balance of power by bringing Ansett into a network of equity linked firms that were the global competitors of Qantas and British
Airways. An united and globally connected Air NZ-Ansett alliance could create strong competition for Qantas. In response to Air NZ's action, Qantas sold its share in Air NZ in March 1997. The resulting reconfiguration is shown in Figure 2 . Airways' share in Qantas, had become part of the competing oneworld alliance, and through it, had become allies of American Airlines and Cathay Pacific. Code-sharing among alliance partners improved efficiency and connectivity, and made it possible for firms to create 'seamless' services without relying on their host states' capacity to negotiate access.
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These new configurations clarified a competitive division between two near-global aviation networks. They created, for networked firms, quasi-monopolistic markets based on inter-firm flows of loyal passengers. They effectively extended market access throughout the network without directly confronting the constraints of the bilateral agreements between states. They extended airlines' spatial reach and enabled them non-exclusive access to each other's domestic markets without the need to enter into equity-based partnerships. They also encouraged firms to frame their interests in global rather than national or regional terms.
The competitive context encouraged service rationalisation and therefore stimulated further shifts in airline ownership. SIA and Qantas each considered increasing their stake in Air NZ, but their plans were frustrated by the New Zealand Government's 25% cap on foreign ownership. After Australia further deregulated ownership rules to allow domestic airlines (i.e Ansett Airlines) to be 100% foreign owned, SIA and Air NZ each considered buying the remaining 50% share of Ansett Airlines. SIA made a friendly offer for the remaining 50% of Ansett Airlines in March 1999. This purchase would have given SIA direct access to the Australian market independent of its links with Air NZ. In the same year, it purchased a 49% share in Virgin Atlantic.
However, under an agreement made when it purchased the first 50% share of Ansett, Air NZ held the right to purchase the second 50% share. This meant that SIA could not buy into Ansett without Air NZ's permission. In the ensuing struggle, Air NZ's largest shareholder, Brierley Investments, manoeuvred to force SIA to purchase Ansett through Air NZ. The seller (News Ltd) subsequently withdrew and the deal collapsed. In February 2000, then, Air NZ exercised its pre-emptive right and purchased the second 50% share of Ansett.
Given that Ansett was a larger airline than Air NZ (in terms of financial resources, aircraft and personnel) this outcome produced considerable disquiet among Ansett employees. and support from the state government in its base city of Brisbane, Virgin made an immediate impression on the already-overcrowded local market. 6 Despite restructuring to reduce its operating costs, Ansett Airlines' full-service delivery model could not compete. In the ensuing price war, Ansett lost market share and was soon losing AUD$2.4 million a day (Easdown and Wilms, 2002, p. 111) . Air NZ sought to halt Virgin's encroachment by offering to buy it out, but Virgin was not for sale. Air NZ's share price plummeted, which in turn pushed it to an unacceptably high debt-to-equity ratio. According to Easdown and Wilms (2002, p. 112) , the New Zealand government ignored capital-for-equity offers by SIA and New Zealand. The configuration of services at the conclusion of this saga is summarised in 
Relational Geographies of Power
The failure of Ansett Airlines was the culmination of a path-dependant sequence of shifting power relationships between airlines and states and among competing airlines. In retrospect,
we can see that as Ansett Airlines became more dependent on other firms, it progressively lost its capacity for autonomous strategising and ultimately became a pawn in the strategies of other firms. Whilst not wishing to overstate the link of strategies to place and tactics to lack of place, there is value in thinking of Ansett's deteriorating position after deregulation as 'displacement' and of its actions after deregulation as survival tactics rather than viable longterm strategies. Conversely, when other airlines used alliances and equity shares to expand their territorial reach, they did so without risking or relinquishing their existing 'place' in territorialised relationships. Throughout, the changing relationships among states and firms were expressed in territorial terms.
In this history, changes in the region's regulatory structure stimulated reconfigurations of relations among firms and therefore in the trajectories of the aviation sectors' geometries of power. However, while states deregulated and privatised their aviation services, national competition and foreign investment regulations continued to limit capital movements and bilateral agreements made within the Freedoms of the Air framework continued to impose territorial limits on aviation markets. In practice, therefore, national regulations maintained national markets that were favourable to former national flagship airlines (see also Button, 2003) . Ansett Airlines' demise was in part a product of its unique status as the only major airline in this story that did not attract state patronage. Paradoxically, then, the airline most disadvantaged by deregulation was the region's only continuously privately owned airline. It appears therefore that the Australasian experience is an exception to Leinbach and Bowen's (2004, p. 296) Nonetheless, the liberalisation process reconstructed the region as a market and redefined the aviation industry's position in state economies. In contrast to its former status as national infrastructure, aviation was redefined as a service industry with the role of linking world cities, delivering transaction cost efficiencies and accelerating commodities trade.
States distanced themselves from direct control of airlines and in effect shifted the airlines from the trade-protected to the trade-exposed sectors of their economies. This discursive repositioning was crucial in altering the context in which the region's aviation power relations were produced and reproduced. Flyvbjerg (1998) argues that powerful actors are those able to define the reality in which power relations are played out. But here, no particular 'powerful actor' was orchestrating the definitional shift. Rather, the aviation sector's position changed because states and firms collectively agreed that it should. Airline 26 firms wanted liberalisation because the bilateral Freedoms of Air framework had become an impediment to multi-destination route and capacity planning in interconnected networks.
States wanted liberalisation to eliminate the cost burden of supporting airlines and to unleash competition that would reduce air transport costs. Nonetheless, since the region's airlines were small in global terms and consequently unlikely to withstand open competition, they also sought protection for their market territories. As a result, flagship airlines remained closely aligned to their parent states.
What then does the demise of Ansett Airlines say about the whereabouts of power?
This shifting set of relationships was characterised by purposeful strategies of firms and states. The outcome, Ansett's disempowerment and displacement, was not the specific intention of any single agent, but the result of deliberate actions among a complicated field of adversaries. The result can be understood only by taking into account the trajectories of these relationships and considering how actions produced a variety of anticipated and unanticipated second-and third-order repercussions. Ansett's strategies in preparation for deregulation appeared rational, but the possibilities available to it were constrained by the structure of the relationships in which it was embedded. In a large part, its disempowerment was an incidental effect of the struggle between SIA and Qantas for control of global connectivities.
In these struggles, each firm's choices were conditioned by its position in networks of Regardless of whether attempts to carve out new positions relied on competitively dislodging competitors or cooperatively building network alliances with them, strategies were conditioned by the uneven distribution of territorialised resources. State-maintained authority over territorialised markets, via the Freedoms of the Air, was the crucial factor in whether or not firms could realise their strategic intentions and whether or not they were able to defend their existing positions. The fact that Ansett had no state-sanctioned 'place' was therefore significant to its demise. Resource differences continue to be important to the operation of power because they condition strategic intentions, shape the choice of means by which agents act and, in large part, determine how others respond.
This narrative also highlights the link between the timing of actions, the types of 
Conclusion
This paper has used the shifting power relations in airline networks to argue that a spatialised understanding of power must take into account resources, capacities positioning and strategies. This example illuminates two neglected aspects of power. First, there were undoubtedly 'powerful actors' in this story. Their secure place enabled them to define situations and to maintain relatively stable power relations across multiple domains. This not only reduced the likelihood of unexpected events occurring, but also produced space; a greater capacity to choose the timing of their strategic plays or to use stalling tactics to further their strategic interests. They were more able to turn complex situations to their advantage (or, at least, to limit the negative consequences). Second, however, the power of powerful actors was not 'held' in reserve, but was a fluid consequence of their spatio-temporal position. Networks of association and histories of interaction are both central to the spatial workings of power.
To conclude, power is not equivalent to strategy, nor is it another word for the boundary between cause and effect. It is a spatialised form of agency, but not one that is confined to the immediacy of particular modalities and their arrangements. Power is found in relational positioning, expresses resource endowments, shapes intentions, defines strategic horizons and conditions the range of possible outcomes. Through these processes, the spatiality of power can be comprehended without resorting to metaphors of flow or translation or the idea that power somehow moves from A to B.
